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for corrective taxes are strongest.
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.1 Introduction
Media industries such as radio, TV, internet, newspapers, and magazines are major
drivers in popular culture, and they take up the lions share of peoples leisure
time. The average American, for example, watches over four hours of TV per day,
whilst European viewers on average spend close to 3 hours and thirty minutes in
front of their television sets.1 It is also a fact that most media rms rely partly
or fully on advertising to provide funding for their business activities. However,
empirical evidence suggests that people dislike ads in media products, at least on
the margin. This has prompted worries about possible excessive advertising from
the societys point of view, and has lead European countries to restrict the amount
of TV commercials.2 US states have also in the past imposed a tax on advertising
in printed media, whilst a tax on ads based on a nuisance argument has been voiced
in New Zealand (Allen et al., 2002).3
It is surprising, given the importance media products play in peoples lives and
the controversy over the use of advertising, that there hardly exists any formal
analysis of how taxes on ads a¤ect managerial behavior. Do managers respond to a
tax on ads by increasing the price of ad inverts? If they do, conventional wisdom
indicates that the content of ads should fall. Such a policy, therefore, seems well
directed. Managers in media rms, however, have the complex task of serving
1See Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006) for further empirical documentation of media usage.
2It is well documented that viewers try to avoid advertising breaks on TV, see Moriarty and
Everett (1994), Danaher (1995), and Wilbur (2008). For printed newspapers there are some in-
dications that the extent to which people consider commercials as bad varies across countries
(Gabszewicz et al., 2004).
3For a review of the continuing discussion of introducing taxes on ads in US states see, e.g., ANA
(2005) and the webpage by the American Advertising Federation (AAF): http://www.aaf.org/ >
government a¤airs.
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di¤erent customers groups at the same time. In particular, they sell their products
to two customer groups; advertisers and consumers.4 This two-sidedness in their
business model suggests certain important trade-o¤s, which after taking into account
the externalities that may exists between customer groups are less clear cut.
To see how the two-sideness a¤ect management decisions, take the example of a
newspaper that is nanced partly by readers and partly by ad inlets. Advertisers
naturally prefer a large readership making it optimal for the newspaper to set low
subscription fees in order to increase the number of readers, since more readers
allows the rm to derive higher advertising revenue. The newspaper, however, must
take into account that readers might dislike ads, at least on the margin. If so, there
are negative externalities from advertisers to readers. A newspaper that derives a
substatial part of its revenue from the reader side of the market, will - if it behaves in
an optimal way - have a low advertising volume compared to freesheets. If not, the
willingness to pay for the newspaper will be excessively low. If, in contrast, readers
perceive ads as a good even on the margin, a prot maximizing media rm will sell
more advertising space than the quantity that maximizes advertising revenue, since
the larger the advertising volume, the higher the readerswillingness to pay for the
newspaper. Arguably this might be the case for some specialized magazines, but
does not seem to hold for the media industry in general. We shall therefore focus on
the case where the public perceives ads as a nuisance, though our formal analysis
also allows us to consider the case of ad-lovers.
Standard tax theory prescribes a corrective tax on a good that imposes negative
externalities. We show, however, that even if ads produce negative externalities
(readers dislike ads), taxing ads may not correct the externality. The reason is that
a tax on ads reduces the protability of selling eyeballs to the advertising market.
4Evans (2003) denes a two-sided market as one where we have (a) two distinct groups of
customers, (b) positive network externalities (at least from one of the customer groups to the
other), and (c) an intermediary that internalizes the externalities between the groups. See Rochet
and Tirole (2006) for a more formal denition.
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This means that a newspaper has less incentives to attract a large readership through
low subscription fees. Introducing a tax on ads, therefore, is likely to hurt readers
because the higher subscription fee may outweigh the benet of viewing less ads.
Rather surprisingly, it might not even be optimal for media rms to reduce the
advertising volume. We show that the advertising volume actually may go up.
To see why, note that the lower protability of selling eyeballs to the advertising
market discourages the media rms from attracting a large audience through a
small advertising volume. If this e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, the advertising volume
is (locally) increasing in the tax rate. Interestingly, this is most likely to be the
case if the audience strongly dislikes ads, i.e. in a situation where the traditional
arguments for imposing a corrective tax are strongest.
Our work is related to the recent development of theories of rm behavior in
two-sided markets - see for instance Anderson and Coate (2005), Armstrong (2006),
Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003), Crampes et al. (2009), Gabszewicz et al. (2002),
and the review by Rochet and Tirole (2006). The focus of these contributions is how
the two-sidedness of markets inuences the pricing decision of rms. The e¤ects of
taxation are masked out in these papers. Kind et al. (2008) discuss the issue
of taxation in two-sided markets but do not consider a tax on ads. Allen et al.
(2002), in contrast, consider a tax on advertising, but resort to a one-sided market
structure.5
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the model of a two-sided
media market, followed by an analysis of the e¤ects of ad taxes in section 3. Section
4 summarizes the results and o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider a rm which sells a media product - labelled newspaper (good N),
for simplicity - to consumers at price pN and ad space (good A) to producers at
5See Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002 for a survey on tax incidence in one-sided markets.
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price pA. Let n and a denote the respective quantities of the two goods. Both
newspaper readers and advertisers are price takers, with inverse demand functions
being downward-sloping in own quantity; pNn  @pN=@n < 0; pAa  @pA=@a < 0.
We shall in order to capture essential features of the media market assume that the
willingness to pay for an ad is increasing in the number of newspaper readers, that
is, @pA=@n  pAn (a; n) > 0: Furthermore, we shall assume that @pN=@a  pNa < 0;
which means that the readerswillingness to pay for the newspaper is decreasing in
the ad-level and thus, that the audience dislike ads.6 We summarize the two latter
assumptions in Assumption 1:
Assumption 1: @pA=@n > 0 and @pN=@a < 0:
We would like to emphasize that the assumption above should not be confused
with standard theory of complements. Complements are used to describe a situation
where an increase in the price of one good causes a decline in consumption of both
goods, measured by the change in the compensated demand by a single consumer
(see e.g., Kreps 1990, p. 61). This is di¤erent from a two-sided market, where
there are two distinct groups of customers that may respond di¤erently to changes
in prices. If a media rm reduces the price of advertising in order to sell more copies
of a newspaper, say, it will have to accept lower sales of the newspaper, since the ad
volume will be higher, other things being equal.
We shal let t be the ad-valorem tax on ads so that the newspaper receives the
net price pA= (1 + t) per advertisement. The tax rate t may deviate from the general
VAT rate; which for simplicity is set equal to zero. The prot level of the newspaper
is given by
 =
pA(a; n)a
1 + t
+ pN(a; n)n  k (a; n) ; (1)
where k (a; n) is the cost function, with ki  0 (i = a; n) and kij R 0 (i 6= j).7
6All the equations that follow go through independently of the sign of pNa .
7Intuitively, one might expect that the marginal cost of printed newspapers is increasing in the
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The media rm maximizes prot with respect to sales of newspapers and adver-
tising space. We presuppose that the second-order conditions for prot maximization
hold; aa < 0; nn < 0; and H  aann   2an > 0.
From (1) we nd that the rst-order condition for the newspapers advertising
volume (a = 0) reads
pA + pAa a
1 + t| {z }
MRa
= ka   pNa n| {z }
PMCa
(2)
The left-hand side of equation (2) measures the marginal revenue on the adver-
tising side of the market of selling ads (MRa), and this term should be set equal to
marginal cost (ka) in a standard one-sided market. However, a one-unit increase in
the ad-level means that the willingness to pay for the newspaper falls by pNa units.
With n newspaper readers, this represents a loss equal to pNa n for the media rm.
We may therefore interpret the sum of the actual marginal costs ka and the exter-
nality term  pNa n > 0 as the newspapers perceived marginal costs of advertising
(PMCa); that is, PMCa  ka pNa n. Equation (2) simply says that these perceived
marginal costs are equal to marginal revenue in optimum. Since PMCa > ka if the
newspaper readers dislike ads, the rst-order condition implies that the media rm
sells a lower ad-volume than what maximizes prots on the ad-side of the market.
Setting n = 0 we further nd that
pN + pNn n| {z }
MRn
= kn   p
A
na
1 + t
;| {z }
PMCn
(3)
which has a similar interpretation to that of equation (2): the marginal revenue
on the newspaper side of the market (MRn) should be set equal to the perceived
marginal costs of selling a newspaper (PMCn). These perceived costs will be smaller
than the actual marginal costs (PMCn < kn) if a larger newspaper circulation
ad-volume, and vice versa (so that kan > 0). However, there may also exist some cost synergies,
which means that kan < 0: Since our theoretical results go through in either case, we leave the
sign of kan unspecied.
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increases the willingness to pay for ads. This is captured by the term pAna= (1 + t) 
0:
From (2) and (3) it follows that:
Lemma 1: Ceteris paribus, an increase in the ad-valorem tax on ads reduces
the marginal revenue of selling ads (@MRa=@t < 0) and increases the perceived
marginal costs of selling newspapers (@PMCn=@t > 0).
Note that PMCn < 0 if kn is su¢ ciently small compared to pAna. This may
for instance be the case with television and electronic newspapers, where marginal
costs are approximately equal to zero. However, PMCa must certainly be positive
if consumers dislike ads, even in cases where ka = 0:
The interrelationship between the two sides of the market is illustrated in Figure
1, where for simplicity marginal costs are set equal to zero. The left-hand side
panel shows the prots in the reader market from selling newspapers, N = pNn;
while the right-hand panel shows the prots in the advertising market from selling
ads, A = p
Aa
1+t
: If the advertisers did not care about the number of readers and
the readers did not care about the number of ads, the newspaper would maximize
prot by setting n = argmaxN and a = argmaxA. However, with pAn > 0 and
pNa < 0; rst-order conditions (2) and (3) imply, other things equal, that we have
nopt > n and aopt < a. So the media rm sell more copies of the newspaper, but
place less ad inverts than in a conventional market with no network externalities.
n
n* n opt
a
a opt a*
(PA)*
PAP
N
(PN)*
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Figure 1: Implications of the rst-order conditions.
3 Tax responses
Standard welfare economics prescribes to tax a good which imposes a negative exter-
nality.8 By assuming pNa < 0 we have tilted the model so that according to standard
theory, levying a tax on ads should have a positive welfare e¤ect. Below, we show
that this does not necessarily hold in a two-sided market.
First-order conditions (2) and (3) make it clear that equilibrium prices and quan-
tities on both sides of the market depend on the tax rate on ads. Di¤erentiating
pA = pA(a(t); n(t)) and pN = pN(a(t); n(t)) with respect to t we nd that the price
changes subsequent to a tax increase are given by
dpA
dt
= pAa
da
dt
+ pAn
dn
dt
and
dpN
dt
= pNn
dn
dt
+ pNa
da
dt
: (4)
By totally di¤erentiating rst order conditions (2) and (3) we further have
da
dt
=
1
H (1 + t)

MRann +
pAna
1 + t
( an)

(5)
and
dn
dt
=
1
H (1 + t)

pAna
1 + t
aa +MRa ( an)

: (6)
The sign of an  @2= (@a@n) turns out to be of particular relevance for the
tax analysis, and by using equations (1) - (3) we nd
an = p
N
a [1 + "n] + p
A
n (1 + t)
 1 [1 + "a]  kan; (7)
where "n  npNa
@pNa
@n
and "a  apAn
@pAn
@a
:
The cross derivative an measures how the marginal protability of selling news-
papers , n; changes if the advertising volume increases. One might think that an
8If pAn and/or p
N
a are di¤erent from zero we have externalities between the customer groups.
The reason is that price-taking producers and consumers do not take into account the e¤ect of
their actions on the demand in either side of the market.
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is negative, given the assumption that the willingness to pay for the newspaper is
decreasing in the advertising volume (pNa < 0): However, if the elasticity of p
N
a with
respect to n is smaller than minus one ("n <  1); the rst term in (7) is positive.
The interpretation of the second term in (7) is similar; this term is positive for
pAn > 0 if "a >  1: Clearly, we might therefore have an > 0; and we are not aware
of any empirical studies which can help us determine the sign. We shall therefore
consider both the case an  0 and an < 0:
4 A tax on ads when an  0
When an  0; the marginal protability of newspaper sales is weakly increasing in
the ad-volume. We shall start this section by assuming that an = 0: In this case an
increase in t unambiguously leads to a lower advertising volume (da=dt < 0), since
the media rms marginal revenue of selling ads falls. Formally, this can be seen
from equation (5), which now simplies to
da
dt

an=0
=
nn
H (1 + t)
MRa < 0: (8)
By taxing ads, the government is able to reduce the ad volume in the newspaper.
Other things equal, this makes the newspaper more attractive for the consumers.
However, this does not imply that output of newspapers increases. On the contrary,
from equation (6) we nd
dn
dt

an=0
=
aa
H (1 + t)2
pAna < 0: (9)
The intuition for why dn=dt < 0 is clear from Lemma 1: a higher tax rate on ads
increases the perceived marginal cost of selling newspapers.9 Thus, it is optimal to
reduce output.
9From (3) we have kn   PMCn = p
A
na
1+t > 0: Substituting for
pAna
1+t into (9) we can write
dn
dt

an=0
= aa
H(1+t)2
(kn   PMCn) < 0:
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The negative quantity e¤ects of a higher tax on ads are magnied ifan > 0, since
a smaller newspaper circulation then reduces the marginal protability of selling
ads and vice versa. This can be veried by noting that the last terms in the square
bracket of (5) and (6) are negative when an > 0: We can therefore state:
Proposition 1: Suppose that an  0. A higher ad-valorem tax on ads reduces
sales of both ads and newspapers ( da=dt < 0 and dn=dt < 0).
Next, consider how an increase in t a¤ects the end-user prices on the two sides
of the market. The direct e¤ect of a smaller sale of newspapers is to increase the
price of newspapers (since the demand curve is assumed to be downward-sloping).
Additionally, the willingness to pay for newspapers increases since the ad-volume is
reduced. From equation (4) we therefore nd dpN=dt > 0:
The e¤ect on the price of ads is ambiguous. The own-price e¤ect suggests that
the price increases, while the fact that newspaper sales fall suggests a lower price.
The net e¤ect depends on which of these e¤ects dominates, such that dpA=dt Q 0:
We can state:
Proposition 2: Suppose that an  0. A higher ad-valorem tax on ads in-
creases the price of newspapers ( dpN=dt > 0), while the e¤ect on the price of ads is
ambiguous ( dpA=dt Q 0).
Somewhat surprisingly, and in sharp contrast to results in one-sided markets,
Proposition 2 shows that the end-user price of the more heavily taxed good might
fall. The end-user price of the good where the tax rate is unchanged, on the other
hand, increases. This goes to show that managerial responses to a tax may be
opposite of what the policy intends to achieve: it may lead to more advertising and
may also have the unintended side-e¤ect of making the media product (newspaper,
say) more expensive to buy.
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4.1 Example 1 (illustration of the case an  0)
In this section we illustrate the paradoxical results above by a specic example.
This example carry merit value on its own since it also reveals that media rms may
argue against a tax on ads for welfare reasons because we show that even though the
consumers by assumption perceive ads as a bad, both the consumers and the society
as a whole might be harmed if ads are taxed. In the main text we limit attention
to a monopoly newspaper, but in the appendix we show that the qualitative results
hold also under duopolistic competition.
We follow Godes et al (2009) and Kind et al (2007, 2009) in assuming that
consumer demand for the newspaper is given by the inverse demand function
pN = 1  n  a; (10)
where  is a positive parameter which measures the readers dislike for ads; the
higher ; the greater the consumersdisutility of ads.
Consumer-good producers advertise in the newspaper if the benet of doing so
is larger than the cost. A producers gross gain from advertising in the newspaper is
naturally increasing in its advertising level (a) and in the number of readers exposed
to its advertising (n). We make it simple by assuming that the gross gain equals
an. With a price per ad equal to pA; the net gain from advertising is
 = an  pAa: (11)
Without a¤ecting the qualitative results, we assume that there is only one advertiser.
Solving a = argmax subject to (10), we nd that the inverse demand curve for
ads equals
pA = 1   pN + 2a . (12)
The willingness to pay for an ad in newspaper i is thus decreasing in its advertising
volume (@pA=@a < 0) and in the consumer price of the newspaper (@pA=@pN < 0):
The reason for the latter is that a higher newspaper price tends to reduce newspaper
circulation, thereby making advertising less attractive.
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Analogously to equation (1), the newspapers prot level equals
 =
pAa
1 + t
+ pNn  k(a; n): (13)
Since the purpose of this example is to illustrate the consequences of taxing
ads when the marginal protability of newspaper sales is increasing in the ad level
(an  @2@n@a > 0), we shall for simplicity set k = 0: We then have
an =
1
1 + t
   > 0: (14)
The assumption that k = 0 is not critical, as long as the costs are not so high as
to make an < 0:
Solving fa; ng = argmax we nd that
n =
8
D1
and a =
4 (1   (1 + t))
D1
. (15)
In the Appendix we show that the denominator D1 is positive when the second-
order conditions and the non-negativity constraints are satised:Non-negative prices
require that  2 (1=3; 1) : If   1=3, consumers have so little aversion against ads
that the media rms prefer to give the newspapers away for free to the consumers.
In this case their whole prot originates from the ad market. Conversely, if   1;
consumers have such a negative attitude towards ads that the media rm maximizes
prots by setting a = 0: In this case its entire revenue is derived from the reader
market.
When analyzing the tax responses in this example, we conne ourselves to con-
sidering the consequences of a small tax increase from t = 0: Di¤erentiating (15)
with respect to t we thus nd that the quantity changes are given by
da
dt

t=0
=  1 + 5
2   2
D21
< 0 and
dn
dt

t=0
=  2 (1  
2)
D21
< 0: (16)
By inserting for (15) into (10) and (12) we further have
dpA
dt

t=0
=   2   7
2 + 1
D21
< 0 for  <  

1 + 2
p
2

=7 (17)
and
dpN
dt

t=0
= 
3 (1 + 2)  2
D21
> 0:
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Figure 2 illustrates equations (16) and (17) graphically. Consistent with Propo-
sition 1, sales of both advertising and newspapers fall subsequent to a higher tax.
Note also that if  <   0:55; the end-user price of newspapers, where the tax
rate is unchanged, increases, while the end-user price of advertising, where the tax
rate has increased, falls: This is consistent with Proposition 2.
The reason why dpA=dt

t=0
< 0 for  <  is that if the readers do not care
much about the ad-volume, the media rm will sell a large amount of newspaper
copies in order to generate a high income from the ad-market. This incentive is
signicantly reduced if ads are taxed. Thus, there will be a big drop in newspaper
sales. This reduces the willingness to pay for ads, leading to a fall in the ad price.
Only for  >  is the own-price e¤ect so strong that the reduced supply of ad space
increases the price of ads.
-1.2
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-0.2
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g
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d t =
0
N
t
dp
dt
=
g
Figure 2: Price and quantity responses.
Figure 2 veries that price and quantity responses to higher taxes in two-sided
markets may di¤er qualitatively from those we nd in one-sided market. A second
deviation from standard results in one-sided markets, is that even a small tax on
a good with negative externalities (advertising) may have negative welfare conse-
quences. To see this, we dene welfare in the usual way as the sum of consumer
surplus, prot, and tax revenue (T ) :
W = CS + 2 +  + T;
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where T = t
1+t
 
2pAa

:
From the envelope theorem it follows that the tax revenue of increasing the
tax rate marginally from t = 0 is equal to the prot losses of the media rms;
d(1+2)
dt

t=0
=   dT
dt

t=0
: This means that dW
dt

t=0
= dCS
dt

t=0
+ d
dt

t=0
: By using
equations (10), () and (12) we nd the following simple expressions for consumer
surplus and prot for the advertiser:10
CS = n2 and  = 2a2:
From this we immediately see that
dCS
dt

t=0
= 2n
dn
dt

t=0
< 0 and
d
dt

t=0
= 4 a
da
dt

t=0
< 0: (18)
It thus follows that for all  2 (1=3; 1) we have
dW
dt

t=0
=  2 (1  ) (1 + 7
2)
D31
< 0:
Even though advertising imposes a negative externality on newspaper readers, a
tax on ads has a negative e¤ect on consumer surplus and welfare. There are two
reasons for this somewhat paradoxical result. First, the tax increases the perceived
marginal costs of selling newspapers, as stated in Lemma 1. This e¤ect is present
independently of the sign of an: Second, if an > 0; the lower output of newspapers
reduces the marginal protability of selling ads, which again reduces the marginal
protability of selling newspapers. In this sense a tax on ads leads to a vicious circle
where output contractions of newspapers and ads mutually reinforce each other.
5 A tax on ads when an < 0
When an < 0; the marginal protability of newspaper sales is decreasing in the ad-
volume. Contrary to the results above, it is then not necessarily true that a higher
10The equation  = a2 might leave the counterintuitive impression that the advertisers prot
level is increasing in : However, this is not correct, since the ad volume is decreasing in the readers
disutility of ads. We consequently nd dd =   2(1 (1+t))(1+(1+t))
3
D31(1+t)
 2 < 0:
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ad-valorem tax on ads reduces sales on both sides of the market: It may actually be
the case that output of either ads or newspapers increases. Equations (5) and (6),
which for the sake of convenience we repeat here, make this clear:
da
dt
=
1
H (1 + t)
2664MRann| {z }
 
+
pAna
1 + t
( an)| {z }
+
3775 (19)
dn
dt
=
1
H (1 + t)
2664 pAna1 + taa| {z }
 
+MRa ( an)| {z }
+
3775
The rst term in the square brackets of (19) is always negative, but the second term
is positive if an < 0. The total e¤ect is thus ambiguous. However, in the Appendix
we prove the following result:
Proposition 3. Suppose an < 0: A higher ad-valorem tax on ads reduces sales
on one side of the market, and may increase sales on the other side. The following
combinations are possible:
(i) da=dt  0 and dn=dt 7 0:
(ii) da=dt > 0 and dn=dt < 0:
If sales of one good drop, the marginal protability of selling the other good
increases when na < 0. This explains why output of the two goods may move in
opposite directions, as stated in Proposition 3. Due to the ambiguity of the quantity
e¤ects, it is clear that also the price responses (4) are ambiguous.
The last part of Proposition 3 is surprising, as it states that the ad-volume may
increase following a rise in the ad tax. We shall now present an illustrative example
with a monopoly newspaper to demonstrate that this result occurs when the readers
disutility from ads is su¢ ciently high (see Appendix for a duopoly version).
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5.1 Example 2 (illustration of the case an < 0)
As in Example 1 we assume that the inverse demand function for newspapers equals
pN = 1  a  n: (20)
For simplicity we further assume that we can linearize demand for ads around the
equilibrium point to
pA = 1  ai + n: (21)
The willingness to pay for an ad is thus decreasing in the ad volume and increasing
in the size of the readership.
The media rmsprot functions are the same as in Example 1 (c.f. equation
(11)), but to ensure as simple as possible that an < 0; we specify the cost function
as k = an+ n=2: We then have
an =  t (1 + ) + 
1 + t
< 0: (22)
The newspaper solves fa; ng = argmax; implying that the rst-order condi-
tions for prot maximization are given by
a = (1 + t)
4  t   (1 + t)
2D2
and n = 2
1  (1 + t) 
2D2
: (23)
The denominator D2 is positive whenever the second-order conditions and non-
negativity constraints hold; this is true for  2 (0; 1) (see Appendix).
To nd the e¤ects of a tax on ads we di¤erentiate (23):
dn
dt

t=0
=   2  2 + 
2
D22 ( + 2)
 1 < 0 and
da
dt

t=0
=
3   2
2D22 ( + 2)
 1 Q 0: (24)
The reason why newspaper sales fall, is that a tax on ads increases the perceived
marginal costs of selling newspapers (c.f. Lemma 1). The drop in newspaper sales
in turn raises the marginal protability of selling ads, and (24) shows that da=dt > 0
if  > 2=3: It is thus when the readersdisutility from ads is su¢ ciently large that
a higher tax on ads leads to more advertising. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which
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also shows that the advertising price (inclusive of taxes) falls when t increases. This
is due to the fact that the willingness to pay for ads is reduced because the newspaper
circulation falls (dn=dt < 0).
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Figure 4: Taxing ads. Consequences for advertising prices and sales volume.
The intuition behind the sign of the quantity change (da=dt) in Figure 4 is as
follows. In order to exploit the protability of the advertising market, it is optimal
for the newspaper to have a relatively low advertising volume (and high advertising
price), and more so the larger is . This ensures that the newspaper will have a large
readership. However, if the advertising revenue is taxed, it will be less protable to
have a high circulation. The lower circulation in turn increases the marginal prots
of selling ads if an < 0: It follows that the media rm has stronger incentives to
increase the advertising volume subsequent to a higher advertising tax the larger is
:11 This explains why da=dt > 0 for su¢ ciently high values of :
Also in this example newspaper readers are adversely a¤ected by a tax on ads,
but interestingly the advertisers might benet. This is true if da=dt > 0: It can
11Mathematically, this can be seen by using equation (7) to nd anjt=0 = pAn      kan. Since
d anjt=0 =d < 0; a given reduction of newspaper sales leads to a larger increase in the marginal
protability of selling ads the higher  is:
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further be shown that
dW
dt

t=0
=  16  30 + 15
2   43
2D22 (2  )
is positive for  2 (0:77; 1:0) : For su¢ ciently high values of  we thus nd that
a small tax on ads increases welfare. However, this is not because the tax leads
to reduced output of the good which imposes a negative externality, but on the
contrary because output of that good increases. This turns standard insight of
how taxes work upside-down. Understanding the business model of media rms is
decisive when assessing the e¤ects of public policies.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have made use of recent advances in the theory of management be-
havior in two-sided markets to analyze how a tax on advertising a¤ect management
decisions. Managers in two-sided platforms coordinate the demand of two distinct
groups of customers. When devising a pricing strategy, management must account
for the interaction between advertisers and consumer. This interaction starts in our
analysis with the assumption that consumers (readers/viewers) perceive ads as a
nuisance. Standard theory would in this case prescribe a tax on ads that makes
management internalize the negative externalities from ads. However, standard
theory neglects the linkages that exist between a platform rms customer groups.
Including these linkages in the analysis, we nd that a tax on ads may have adverse
e¤ects and therefore lead to undesirable policy outcomes.
In particular, we show that taxes on ads reduce the media rmsincentives to
attract a large audience that can be sold on the advertising market. Such taxes
are therefore likely to harm the consumers, e.g. through higher prices and possibly
even through higher advertising levels. This suggests that targeting market failure
directly as standard theory prescibes, may not be the solution in markets where
there are network externalities. Given the leisure time media products occupy in
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peoples life, and the importance media products has in popular culture, one should
therefore be careful when devising policy directed at this industry. Our study, then,
shows that in a two-sided market such as the media market conventional use of taxes
to correct for externalities is likely to produce unintended results. This is so because
managers rationally takes into account that their model of business must trade o¤
revenue from readers and advertisers. This trade o¤ leads to a particular behavior
by managers not found in businesses with only one customer group.
7 Appendix
7.1 Calculation of Example 1
Dene D1  24 4 (2 + (1 + t) 2) (1 + t) : Using equations (10), (12) and (13) we
nd @
21
@n21
< 0; @
21
@a21
< 0 and
H 

@21
@n21

@21
@a21

 

@21
@n1@a1
2
=
D1
4(1 + t)
:
A su¢ cient condition for H to be positive, and thus for the second-order conditions
to hold, is that D1 > 0:
Inserting for (10) and (12) into (15) we have
pN = 4
3 (t+ 1)  1
D1 (1 + t)
and (25)
pA = 4
1 +  (t+ 1)
D1
:
From (25) we nd
dpN
dt

t=0
= 16
3  2 + 32
D21
> 0
and
dpA
dt

t=0
=  4 4 (2   7
2 + 1)
D21
T 0:
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The upward-sloping curve in Figure 3 is found by setting dp
A
dt

t=0
= 0:
Note from (25) that both pA and pN are non-negative for t = 0 i¤ 2 [1=3; 1] :Q:E:D:
7.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Note that H  aann   2an > 0 which, when an < 0, implies
aa
an
>
an
nn
> 0:
Rearranging both derivatives in (19), while using the above inequality, proves both
statements in Proposition 3. Q.E.D.
7.3 Calculation of Example 2
Dene D2 = 4 (1 + t)  ( (1 + t) + t)2 : Using equations (13), (10), and (21) we nd
@2
@n2
< 0; @
2
@a2
< 0 and
H 

@21
@n2

@21
@a2

 

@21
@n@a
2
=
D2
4(1 + t)
:
A su¢ cient condition for H to be positive, and thus for the second-order conditions
to hold, is that D2 > 0: This is ensured in the numerical example.
From (23) we have the following quantity responses to a VAT on ads:
da
dt

t=0
=
3   2
2D22 ( + 2)
 1 and
dn
dt

t=0
=   2  2 + 
2
D22 ( + 2)
 1 :
Inserting for the equilibrium quantities into the demand functions and di¤erentiating
we further have:
dpN
dt

t=0
=
4  2   2
2D22 ( + 2)
 1 and
dpA
dt

t=0
=   2   + 2
2
2D22 ( + 2)
 1 :
Q.E.D.
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7.4 Example 1 with duopolistic competition
With duopolistic competition (two newspapers) we follow Kind et al (2007) and
assume that the consumers have the following utility function:
U =
2X
i=1
ni  
24(1  s) 2X
i=1
n2i
2
+ s
 
2X
i=1
ni
2
!235 ; i = 1; 2: (26)
The variable ni in equation (26) denotes consumption of newspaper i = 1; 2;
while the parameter s 2 [0; 1] measures how di¤erentiated the newspapers are; from
the readers point of view they are completely unrelated if s = 0 (so that each
newspaper behaves as a monopoly), while they are considered as perfect substitutes
if s = 1: More generally, the readers perceive the newspapers as closer substitutes
the higher s is.12
With two newspapers consumer surplus equals
CS = U  
2X
i=1
 
pNi + ai

ni:
Maximizing consumer surplus with respect to consumption of the two newspapers
generates the inverse demand function
pNi = 1  (2  s)ni=2  ai   snj=2 (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j): (27)
The advertisers prot function equals
 =
 
2X
i=1
aini
!
 
 
2X
i=1
pAi ai
!
: (28)
Solving fa1; a2g = argmax  subject to (27) yields the following inverse demand
curve for ads in newspaper i:
pAi = 1 
(2  s)  pNi + 2ai  s  pNj + 2aj
2 (1  s) (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j). (29)
12The Shubik-Levitan (1980) formulation in equation (26) ensures that the parameter s only
captures product di¤erentiation and not the size of the market. This is in contrast to the standard
quadratic utility function, where one and the same parameter measures both product di¤erentiation
and market size. See Motta (2004) for details.
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Since the two newspapers compete in the reader market if s > 0; equation (29) shows
that the willingness to pay for ads in newspaper i is increasing in the advertising
level and price of newspaper j:
Analogously to the monopoly case considered in the main text, the prot level
of newspaper i equals
i =
pAi ai
1 + t
+ pNi ni;
where we have maintained the assumption that k = 0:
Solving fai; nig = argmaxi simultaneously for the two media rms, we nd
a unique symmetric equilibrium. Omitting subscripts, output of newspapers and
advertising is given by
n =
2 (4  3s)
D1
and a =
4 (1   (1 + t)) (1  s)
D1
. (30)
The denominator is equal toD1  3 (8 (1  s) + s2)  4 (2 + (1 + t) 2) (1 + t) (1  s) :
In the main text we assumed that s = 0; which means that each media rm has
monopoly power in its own market segment. All the qualitative results above survive
as long as the consumers perceive the media products as imperfect substitutes. In
particular, the rms will use their market power to shift part of the tax burden over
to the consumers and the advertisers if s < 1 (contrary to what the protably would
be able to do in a one-sided market with k = 0). The ability to do so is smaller
the more ercly the rms compete, though. This is most obvious if we use equation
(30) and consider the consequences of a small tax increase from t = 0 on output:
dn
dt

t=0
=  8 (1  s)  (1  
2) (4  3s)
D21
< 0 (31)
da
dt

t=0
=  4 (1  s) 4 (1 + 5
2   2) (1  s) + 3s22
D21
< 0:
Equation (31) shows that sales of both newspapers and advertising space fall
subsequent to an increase in t as long as there is imperfect competition between the
rms: However, as s! 1 we have dn=dt = da=dt! 0: The reason for this is that the
consumers perceive the newspapers as perfect substitutes at s = 1; implying that the
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media rms have no market power. Then the advertising tax works as a pure surplus
tax. Thus, it is only in the limit case where the rms produce perfect substitutes
that the qualitative results di¤er between a monopoly and duopoly setting.
7.5 Example 2 with duopolistic competition
In the duopolistic version of Example 1 we showed that the media rmspossibility
of shifting the tax burden over to consumers and advertisers is smaller the less
di¤erentiated the consumers perceive the media products to be (as measured by
the parameter s). It can be shown that the e¤ects of an increase in s (reduced
newspaper di¤erentiation) are the same in a duopolistic version of Example 2. For
simplicity we therefore set s = 0: This means that we can simplify equation (27),
which expresses consumer demand for the two media products, to
pNi = 1  ai   ni: (32)
We now let advertising demand be equal to
pAi = 1  ai + ni   haj: (33)
The inclusion of the parameter h 2 [0; 1] in equation (33) is inspired by Godes et al
(2008), and measures to what extent the two newspapers compete in the advertising
market. If h = 0 each newspaper has monopoly power in the advertising market,
while they are perceived as perfect substitutes if h = 1: More generally, we have
duopolistic competition between the newspapers in the ad market if h > 0:
Maintaining the assumption that ki = aini+ni=2; we have an =   t(1+)+1+t < 0:
The newspapers solve fai; nig = argmaxi simultaneously. Omitting subscripts,
the rst-order conditions for a symmetric equilibrium are given by
a = (1 + t)
4  t   (1 + t)
2D2
and n =
2  (1 + t) (2   h)
2D2
: (34)
The denominator equalsD2 = 2 (2 + h) (1 + t) ( (1 + t) + t)2 :We further have@21@n21 <
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0; @
21
@a21
< 0 and
H 

@21
@n21

@21
@a21

 

@21
@n1@a1
2
=
D2   2h (1 + t)
4 (1  s) (1 + t) :
A su¢ cient condition for H to be positive, and thus for the second-order conditions
to hold, is that D2   2h (1 + t) > 0:
From (34) we have the following quantity responses to a higher VAT on ads:
da
dt

t=0
=
3   2
2D22 ( + 2)
 1   h
2 ( + 1)
2D22
and (35)
dn
dt

t=0
=   2  2 + 
2
D22 ( + 2)
 1   h
 
5  ( + 1)2
2D22
:
Inserting for the equilibrium quantities into the demand functions and di¤erentiating
implies that:
dpN
dt

t=0
=
4  2   2
2D22 ( + 2)
 1 + h
2 + 4
2D22
and (36)
dpA
dt

t=0
=   2   + 2
2
2D22 ( + 2)
 1 + h
( + 1) (h   + 1)
D22
:
The rst terms on the right-hand-side of equations (35) and (36) are the same as
when we considered a monopoly newspaper. Since the second terms are continuos in
h, it follows that the results do not critically depend on whether there is competition.
Indeed, it can be veried that the signs on dn=dt; dpA=dt and dpN=dt are the same
for monopolists as for duopolists. It can further be shown that a su¢ cient condition
for the monopoly result da=dt > 0 to hold is that h < 3=4; and that it holds for any
value of h if  < 2=3. The reason why we otherwise may have da=dt < 0; is that
the larger h is; the less market power each newspaper will have in the advertising
market, and the less protable it is to sell more advertising space if ad revenue
become taxed.
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